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In an era of increased globalisation, governments implement policies seeking to encourage
local ￿rms to become global and sell their goods on foreign markets. Governmental export
agencies put in considerable e⁄ort and resources in setting up trade promotion trips, infor-
mation packs, loans and subsidies, etc. Behind these policies lies the belief that it would be
pro￿table for ￿rms to export, but that they often lack the information and funds to go ahead,
which is where their national authorities can help them. Despite the widespread use of these
interventions, there is little empirical evidence on how important ￿nancial considerations are
for the international expansion of ￿rms.
Building a theoretical model and taking it to the data with two novel datasets, this paper
considers the determinants of ￿rm exporting behaviour. In particular, it seeks to analyse
whether there is any interaction between ￿nancial and credit constraints on the one hand
and exports on the other. The literature on ￿rm-level trade has so far mostly concentrated
on the interactions between trade and productivity. This paper considers another critical
issue in understanding the exporting decisions of ￿rms: the ￿nancial situation of the ￿rm,
and in particular the credit constraints it faces. Decisions by ￿rms cannot solely rely on
productivity considerations given that ￿rms might be ￿nancially-constrained. In particular,
these constraints will a⁄ect volumes and patterns of trade and the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium
outcome.
A heterogeneous ￿rms model of international trade is constructed with liquidity-constrained
￿rms. It yields several predictions on the equilibrium relationships between productivity,
credit constraints and exports that are then veri￿ed in the data. The main contribution of
this paper is to show that ￿rms are more likely to be exporters if they are more produc-
tive and less credit-constrained. Regarding the patterns of trade, ￿rms are more likely to
start exporting to a new destination and to export to many destinations if they face fewer
liquidity restrictions. Once they do start exporting to a given country, credit constraints
do not a⁄ect the value and growth of their exports. There is therefore a strong relation-
ship between the extensive margin of trade at the destination level and credit constraints,
while the intensive margin is not a⁄ected. This is the second prediction of the model and
holds in the data. Third, the data con￿rms the theoretical prediction of a pecking order
of trade: ￿rms exporting to the smallest and furthest away economies are more productive
and less credit-constrained. Finally, the model allows one to consider an additional e⁄ect of
the presence of credit-constrained potential exporters, by decomposing the consequences of
a domestic currency appreciation on trade ￿ ows. The data reveals that three e⁄ects hold:
existing exporters will export less, the least productive existing exporters stop exporting and
the most productive constrained non-exporters start exporting.
The issue of ￿nancial constraints has very rarely been considered in the literature on
international trade, and the main contribution of this paper is to present both theoretical
and empirical ￿ndings on this matter. There is a large literature on exporting behaviour at
the ￿rm level and the characteristics of exporters, with a strong emphasis on the link between
trade and productivity. On credit constraints, Chaney (2005b) provides a theoretical model of
trade with heterogeneous ￿rms, along the lines of Melitz (2003), and introduces an exogenous
liquidity constraint to derive his results. However, he does not include any empirical test of
his predictions. The model in this paper builds on his work but improves the way liquidity
constraints are represented, thus yielding a richer framework. In Manova￿ s (2006) paper,
credit constraints interact with ￿rm productivity, thus reinforcing the way those ￿rms with
higher productivity select into exporting. Despite the model being at the ￿rm level, the
focus of her paper is on the di⁄erences in countries￿and sectors￿access and need for external
￿nance and how these shape export patterns. This model borrows her speci￿cation of ￿nancial
constraints to which an exogenous component is added, but by considering a general rather
than partial equilibrium, the analysis concentrates on the ￿rm-level interactions between
exports and credit constraints.
Empirically, the detail of the datasets used is particularly suitable for the question ad-
1dressed. First, the trade and balance sheet data used covers the full sample of Belgian manu-
facturing, at the ￿rm level, with detailed information on export participation, but also on the
destinations and products exported. As previously shown in the literature, larger and more
productive ￿rms are more likely to be exporters (for example, Bernard and Jensen, 2004),
and to export more products to more destinations. Credit constraints have not been included
in most ￿rm-level empirical studies of trade. Manova (2006) uses industry- and country-level
data to test the predictions of her model. The literature on ￿nancial institutions and trade
does likewise, showing that export volumes from ￿nancially-vulnerable sectors are higher in
￿nancially-developed countries (Beck, 2002 and 2003, Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005 and Hur et
al., 2006). Using ￿rm-level analysis in this paper allows a better understanding of how ￿rms
vary within a given sector. The implications of the results would therefore allow policies to be
better targeted. Second, the measure of credit constraint used is unique in its kind, as it is a
yearly measure of the creditworthiness of ￿rms, established by an institution external to the
￿rm, a credit insurer - Coface International. Campa and Shaver (2002) present evidence of the
relationship between export status and liquidity constraints for manufacturing ￿rms in Spain
in the 1990s. However, their data does not allow the actual export patterns at the ￿rm level
to be analysed in detail. Greenaway et al (2007) explore the impact of ￿nancial constraints
on export participation by using balance sheet variables to measure these constraints. Also,
a vast literature on the importance of liquidity constraints for ￿rms, which will be brie￿ y
described when presenting the Coface score and its advantages, has developed several mea-
sures which mainly make it possible to categorise ￿rms between ￿nancially-constrained or
unconstrained. It examines the e⁄ects of credit constraints on di⁄erent decisions, such as in-
vestment, but none of them applies these techniques to understanding exporting behaviour.
The approach that follows uses an original and valid measure of credit constraint to gauge
its importance on ￿rm level exports.
This paper demonstrates the importance of credit constraints when considering export
patterns at the level of the ￿rm. It leads to a more general question of the role of liquidity
constraints for ￿rm dynamics and growth (Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2006) and for export
growth within the ￿rm, fruitful areas for future research.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the model and its predictions.
Section 3 presents the data, and demonstrates in particular why the Coface score is an
appropriate measure of credit constraints. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis of the
links between export patterns and credit constraints and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section presents a model of trade with liquidity-constrained ￿rms in a Melitz (2003)-
type heterogeneous ￿rms model of international trade. Only two models in the literature
on heterogeneous ￿rms and export decisions consider ￿nancing constraints, namely Chaney
(2005b) and Manova (2006). This model extends the existing literature by incorporating
external ￿nancing into Chaney￿ s model. As a result, a ￿rm has three sources of liquidity
to ￿nance the sunk costs of exporting. A ￿rm￿ s liquidity comprises internal ￿nancing and
exogenous shocks as in Chaney (2005b) as well as external ￿nancing. This implies that the
￿rm faces credit constraints due to imperfect ￿nancial contractibility, as in Manova￿ s approach
(2006). The purpose of writing a model featuring both internal and external constraints will
allow us to properly specify the empirical approach using ￿rm-level data and capture certain
speci￿cities of the data. In future work, an extension of the model into a dynamic setting
would allow the analysis of the interactions between the di⁄erent sources of ￿nancing and the
possibility of their sequential use.
2.1 Set-up
The economy consists of two countries Home and Foreign (the latter is hereafter denoted with
an asterisk *). The only factor of production is labour, and population is of size L. There
2are two sectors. One sector provides a single homogeneous good which is freely traded. This
good is used as the numeraire, and its price is therefore equal to 1. Production in this sector
is characterised by constant returns to scale with q0 = B ￿ l0, l0 being the labour used to
produce quantity q0 of the good. By choice of scale, the unit labour requirement at home
is 1=w (B = w) and 1=w￿ in foreign( B￿ = w￿). Therefore, as shall be assumed, if both
countries produce the homogeneous good, wages will be ￿xed by this sector￿ s production at
w and w￿respectively. The second sector produces a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods. Each
￿rm operating in this sector supplies one of these goods and is a monopolist for its variety.
2.2 Demand
Consumers are endowed with one unit of labour and their preferences over the di⁄erentiated
good display a constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Given their love of variety, they will
consume all available varieties. The utility function of the representative consumer can be
represented by U:
U ￿ q1￿￿
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where the utility level is determined by the consumption of q0 units of the homogeneous
good and q(!) units of each variety ! of the di⁄erentiated good. The set ￿ includes all
varieties ! and is determined in equilibrium. The constant elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties of the di⁄erentiated good is denoted by ￿ > 1.
If all varieties in ￿ are available domestically at price p(!) the ideal price index will be:
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0
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This implies that the representative consumer has an isoelastic demand function for each
di⁄erentiated variety q(!):
q(!) = ￿wL
￿
p(!)￿￿
P1￿￿
￿
(3)
This demand function, given the domestic price p(!), implies that the representative con-
sumer spends r(!) on each variety !, where ￿wL is the total amount spent on di⁄erentiated
goods:
r(!) = ￿wL
￿
p(!)
P
￿1￿￿
(4)
2.3 Production
Production in the di⁄erentiated goods sector is characterised by a constant marginal cost.
Both countries enjoy the same technology and the marginal product of labour is constant.
As in Chaney (2005a), it is assumed that there is a ￿xed number of potential entrants
proportional to the size of the country, such that the mass of ￿rms in each country in that
sector is also proportional to L or L￿. There are ￿xed costs for a ￿rm to start producing:
each ￿rm has to pay a ￿xed entry cost Cd in terms of domestic labour, at a price wCd in
terms of the numeraire. This introduces increasing returns to scale in the production process.
Each ￿rm chooses to produce a di⁄erent variety !. It draws a random unit labour produc-
tivity x ￿ 0 which determines its production cost. As in Melitz (2003), higher productivity
is modelled as producing a given variety at a lower marginal cost. There are also two types
of trade barriers if a ￿rm wishes to serve Foreign. First, the ￿rm needs to pay a ￿xed cost
3of exporting Cf, paid exclusively in terms of foreign labour, which is w￿Cf in terms of the
numeraire. The crucial assumption of this cost being borne in terms of foreign labour is justi-
￿ed, as ￿rms need, for example, to cover the cost of travelling to the country for prospection,
buying local information, carrying out marketing and competition studies, tailoring goods
to local demand and establishing a distribution network. A second part of ￿xed costs of
exporting paid at home in terms of domestic labour would lower the number of exporters
and amount of total exports but would not change the qualitative results of the model. The
same assumption is made in Chaney (2005b).
Serving the foreign market also involves a variable "iceberg" transport cost ￿. Shipping
one unit of any variety of the di⁄erentiated good implies only fraction 1=￿ arrives in Foreign
because the rest melts on the way.
These di⁄erent assumptions mean that the cost of producing quantity qd for the home
market is cd (qd):
cd (qd) = qd
w
x
+ wCd (5)
and cost of producing qf units for the foreign market is cf (qf), given the ￿rm is already
producing for domestic consumers:
cf (qf) = qf
￿w
x
+ w￿Cf (6)
Given ￿rms are monopolists for the variety they produce, they set the price. Given the
isoelastic demand functions, the optimal price is a constant mark-up over unit cost, including
transport cost. This implies:
pd (x) =
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
w
x
(7)
at Home, and:
pf (x) =
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿w
x
(8)
in Foreign.
These pricing choices imply that any given ￿rm having drawn productivity level x, could
make a pro￿t of ￿d (x) in the domestic market, and ￿f (x) abroad:
￿d (x) =
rd (x)
￿
￿ wCd =
￿
￿
wL
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
w
xP
￿1￿￿
￿ wCd (9)
￿f (x) =
rf (x)
￿
￿ w￿Cf =
￿
￿
w￿L￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿w
xP￿
￿1￿￿
￿ w￿Cf (10)
In order to survive, a ￿rm will need to produce domestically with a pro￿t, whereas in order
to export, it will need to pro￿tably produce for foreign consumers. Given equations (9) and
(10), this leads me, as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2005a and b) to de￿ne two productivity
thresholds, xd and xf , at which ￿rms respectively choose to start producing and exporting,
when they face no liquidity constraint:
￿d (xd) = 0 and ￿f (xf) = 0 (11)
The monopolistic competition setting and the heterogeneity of ￿rms in terms of pro-
ductivity implies a partition of ￿rms between producers/non-producers and exporters/non-
exporters if trade costs are su¢ ciently high. From the pro￿t functions, it is clear that
more productive ￿rms will be able to charge lower prices, therefore ensuring themselves
larger market shares and bene￿ting from larger pro￿ts, both in the domestic and export
markets. On the domestic market, this means that the least productive ￿rms do not sur-
vive, although the imperfect nature of competition implies that some low-productivity ￿rms
4are protected from competition if ￿ is ￿nite and can therefore survive. Similarly, on for-
eign markets, a partition is made as only the most productive ￿rms export. Given that
(xf=xd )
￿￿1 =
￿
￿￿￿1Cf=Cd
￿
￿(L=L￿)￿(P=P￿)
￿￿1, if trade barriers are assumed high enough,
xf > xd will always hold. This implies that ￿rms that are productive enough to export are
also producing domestically.
The model so far is identical to Chaney (2005b), and almost identical to Melitz (2003)
but for the presence of a numeraire sector, the ￿rms￿entry process and potential asymmetry
between countries. Liquidity constraints are now introduced.
2.4 Liquidity constraints
In the setting above, exporting involves ￿xed costs. These must mostly be paid before any
pro￿ts are made abroad. If ￿nancial markets are imperfect, this leads to ex-ante under-
investment in exporting activities. A di⁄erent nature of contracting and informational envi-
ronment in Foreign implies that this is more the case than for domestic entry costs. Foreign
activities are less veri￿able and are considered more risky, as they involve, for example, the
use of a foreign currency. The weak contracting environment in some foreign countries means
it is harder to recover unpaid dues abroad, and therefore ￿rms are unable to pledge as much
collateral for exports. These di⁄erent elements mean that potential investors or lenders may
not be willing to help would-be exporters cover the ￿xed cost of starting to export.
Combining the assumptions made in Chaney (2005b) and Manova (2006) allows the con-
struction of a richer model, which will be better suited to analyse the data thereafter. Mod-
elling the investor￿ s decision in extending credit to ￿rms more explicitly than in Chaney￿ s
set-up allows one to capture the interaction that exists between a ￿rm￿ s performance and its
liquidity. But including an exogenous component to liquidity, as in Chaney (2005), allows
for the presence of ￿rms with no liquidity constraints but low productivity, as in the data.
Also, by making some simplifying assumptions on price indices, as in Chaney, the model can
be solved in a general equilibrium and thereafter can analyse the e⁄ects of exchange rate
appreciations. The resulting model o⁄ers interesting predictions that are then taken to the
data.
It is assumed, for simplicity, that there is no liquidity or credit constraint for ￿rms to
￿nance their domestic production. In a ￿rst step, as in Manova (2006), ￿rms can ￿nance the
variable cost of exporting internally. The ￿xed cost of exporting is assumed to be ￿nanced in
three di⁄erent ways. First, a ￿rm can use the pro￿ts generated from domestic sales ￿d (x).
Second, each ￿rm is endowed with an exogenous random liquidity shock A, denominated in
units of domestic labour. Its value is hence wA. A and x (the productivity parameter) are
drawn from a joint distribution with cumulative distribution function F(A;x) over R+ ￿R+,
and Fx (x) ￿ limA!1 F (A;x) over R+. It is also assumed that the group of entrepreneurs,
and hence the mass of ￿rms entering the lottery, is proportional to L, the size of the country.
Third, a ￿rm can decide to borrow an amount E on ￿nancial markets. In order to do so,
it must pledge tangible assets as collateral, and it is assumed that these will be proportional
to the ￿xed cost paid to enter the domestic market (e.g. cost of building the factory). The
proportionality ts is inherent to the nature of the industry with s denoting the sector, as in
Manova (2006) and Braun (2003): tswCd will be pledgeable as collateral on ￿nancial markets.
The probability of a ￿rm defaulting on its loan is 1 ￿ ￿, which re￿ ects the level of ￿nancial
contractibility, exogenously determined by the strength of ￿nancial institutions in the home
country (in the empirical section, Belgium). The contracting timing is as follows. At the
start of each period, potential investors receive a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er contract from each
￿rm, detailing the amount to be borrowed, the repayment G and the collateral. Revenues
are then realised and, at the end of the period, the creditor claims the collateral tswCd if the
￿rm defaults, or receives payment G(x) if the contract is enforced.
Given these three possibilities for ￿nancing the ￿xed cost of exporting, the liquidity con-
straint can be expressed as: wA + ￿d (x) + E ￿ w￿Cf. A higher domestic pro￿t therefore
relaxes the ￿rm￿ s credit constraint. The ￿rm needs to borrow kw￿Cf to cover the ￿xed cost
5of exporting, by de￿ning the share (1 ￿ k) of this cost that can be covered internally by the
￿rm such that (1￿k)w￿Cf = wA+ ￿d (x). As domestic pro￿t increases, k decreases and the
￿rm is less credit-constrained.
Below, the expression for pro￿ts on the foreign market re￿ ects the fact that the ￿rm
￿nances a fraction (1 ￿ k) of the ￿xed costs and all of its variable costs internally. As
for the share k that is ￿nanced externally, the exporter pays with probability ￿ the investor
G(x) when the ￿nancial contract is enforced and with probability 1￿￿ replaces the collateral
claimed by the creditor. Exporters from Home choose their price and output levels for foreign
by maximising pro￿ts on the foreign market:
￿f (x) = pf (x)qf (x) ￿
qf(x)￿w
x
￿ (1 ￿ k)w￿Cf ￿ ￿G(x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)tswCd (12)
subject to
qf (x) = ￿w￿L￿pf (x)
￿￿
P￿1￿￿
NR(x) = pf (x)qf (x) ￿
qf(x)￿w
x
￿ (1 ￿ k)w￿Cf ￿ G(x)
B (x) = ￿G(x) + (1 ￿ ￿)tswCd ￿ kw￿Cf ￿ 0
There are three constraints to this maximisation problem. The ￿rst condition arises even
without imperfect ￿nancial markets, as it represents the demand condition. The second
condition re￿ ects the maximum net revenues NR(x) the ￿rm can o⁄er to the creditor: its
revenue on the foreign market, minus the variable cost and share (1 ￿ k) of ￿xed cost, both
￿nanced internally. The third condition expresses the net return to the investor B (x) being
positive. This is equal to their expected return, given the probability of default, minus the
amount they have lent to the exporter to ￿nance a share k of the ￿xed cost. The investor
will only ￿nance the ￿rm if he expects to at least break even. The amount borrowed by the
￿rm from the external investor is kw￿Cf = [w￿Cf ￿ wA ￿ ￿d (x)]1.
As credit markets are competitive, all investors break even and have zero expected pro￿ts.
Firms choose G(x) so as to bring the investor to his participation constraint. B (x) = 0 in
equilibrium. This implies that the ￿rm￿ s maximisation problem is identical to the case without
credit constraints, except that G(x) cannot be greater than net revenues. Hence, as in Melitz
(2003):
pf (x) =
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿w
x
, qf (x) =
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿w
x
￿￿￿ ￿w￿L￿
P￿1￿￿ , (13a)
￿f (x) =
rf (x)
￿
￿ w￿Cf =
￿
￿
w￿L￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿w
xP￿
￿1￿￿
￿ w￿Cf , (13b)
rf (x) = ￿w￿L￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿w
xP￿
￿1￿￿
(13c)
If there are no credit constraints, the threshold xf is therefore de￿ned by
￿f (xf) = 0 or rf (xf) = ￿w￿Cf
xf =
￿
￿Cf
￿L￿
￿ 1
￿￿1 ￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿w
P￿ (14)
1For simplicity, as in Manova (2006), I normalise the outside option of the investor to 0, rather than to the
world-market net interest rate r. This does not change the qualitative predictions of the model.
6Yet, taking into account the presence of imperfect ￿nancial markets and hence credit
constraints, the second constraint of the pro￿t maximisation problem of equation (12) is
considered: NR(x;pf (￿);qf (￿);B (x) = 0) = G(x(A)). This yields the following revenue
function:
rf (x(A)) = ￿
"
1
￿
w￿Cf ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(ts ￿ 1)wCd ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
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￿
￿
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￿
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w
x(A)P
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(15)
Therefore, if ￿ = 1, this is equivalent to the original Melitz (2003) result of equations (13)
and x(A) = xf. If not, the productivity threshold for starting to export is de￿ned by:
x(A) = w
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿￿1 ￿
1
￿
w￿Cf ￿
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￿
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￿
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￿
1
P
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Firms with productivity below x(A) will not be able to export due to credit constraints,
despite some of them being su¢ ciently productive to do so pro￿tably.
2.5 Open-economy equilibrium
In order to consider ￿rm entry and exit and the e⁄ect of exchange rate variations, this sub-
section computes the open-economy equilibrium.
It is assumed for simplicity, as in Chaney (2005b), that the price index only depends on
local ￿rms￿prices and that foreign ￿rms do not face any liquidity constraints. Prices set by
foreign ￿rms for the varieties they sell at home only have a small impact on the general price
index. In a relatively closed economy, it is a reasonable approximation, which allows for the
model to be solved. The price index of equation (2) can be approximated by:
P ￿
0
@
Z
x￿xd
pd (x)
1￿￿ LdFx (x)
1
A
1
1￿￿
(17)
For convenience, function h(:) is de￿ned as:
h(￿) : x￿￿1 =
0
@￿
￿
Z
x￿x
x￿￿1dFx (x)
1
A ￿ C () x = h(C) (18)
with h0 > 0
This allows one to rewrite the productivity thresholds of equations (11), (14) and (16) 2:
xd = h(Cd) (19)
xf =
￿
Cf
C￿
d
￿ 1
￿￿1
￿
w
w￿h(C￿
d) (20)
which are equivalent to the results of Chaney (2005b), and
2Note that these thresholds do not depend on market sizes. This is due to the assumption that prices
are determined by domestic producers only, whose number is proportional to the size of the market. Larger
markets will have more varieties, and therefore pro￿ts will not be higher.
7x(A) =
"
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ts)Cd + w￿
w Cf ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)A
￿￿1￿￿ ￿w￿
w
￿￿ ￿
h
￿
C￿
d
￿￿1￿￿ C￿
d + (1 ￿ ￿)(h(Cd))
1￿￿ Cd
# 1
￿￿1
(21)
All ￿rms with productivity above xd will be producing for domestic consumers. Firms with
a productivity above maxfxf;x(A)g will be able to export because they are both productive
enough and have su¢ cient liquidity to cover the ￿xed costs.
Equation (21) re￿ ects the way ￿rms cover ￿xed costs of exporting and how productivity
levels will a⁄ect their decision to export. First, note that if ￿nancial contracts were perfectly
enforced and ￿ = 1, the two thresholds xf and x(A) are equal. If this is not the case, looking
at A, the amount of exogenous liquidity matters. Firms with a small amount of exogenous
liquidity will need to compensate with a higher productivity level to be able to have both a
larger pro￿t on the domestic market and a better access to external ￿nance to pay upfront
the ￿xed cost of exporting. Firms with higher productivity can obtain more outside ￿nance
because their net revenues and the repayments they o⁄er their investors will be greater.
Naturally, a higher ￿xed cost of exporting Cf also increases the threshold, all other things
being equal. Firms in sectors in which tangible assets are more easily collateralisable (higher
ts) will need a lower level of productivity to obtain su¢ cient external ￿nance and domestic
pro￿ts to become exporters.
The impact of domestic ￿xed-entry cost is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher
Cd implies lower pro￿ts on the domestic market, thus reducing available liquidity and in-
creasing the threshold. On the other, it implies higher tangible assets, and also makes it
more di¢ cult for ￿rms to start producing at home, hence reducing competition, increas-
ing market shares of those that do survive and consequently their pro￿ts. The total e⁄ect
depends on the distribution of ￿rm productivity. Two other elements will be a⁄ecting the
pro￿tability of the foreign markets, and hence the productivity threshold. This is also true
for the threshold with no liquidity constraints. First, the greater the iceberg cost ￿, the lower
the pro￿ts in Foreign. A lower C￿
d means that more foreign ￿rms will be entering their own
market, hence reducing the market shares of home exporters and their pro￿ts. The reduction
in the pro￿tability of foreign markets has an additional e⁄ect in the presence of ￿nancial
frictions, as it will reduce the repayments they can o⁄er to investors. Finally, the relative
wage w￿=w a⁄ects the productivity threshold through three channels. When it decreases,
so does w￿
w Cf: the ￿xed cost of entry into the foreign market being paid in foreign wages
will imply less domestic liquidity needed to be an exporter. Second, as in the absence of
liquidity constraints, a decrease in Foreign￿ s wage implies a smaller market abroad. A higher
wage at home increases production costs. Together, these imply lower pro￿ts in Foreign and
therefore a higher productivity threshold. The third e⁄ect of a lower relative wage occurs
in the presence of liquidity constraints, where ￿ < 1. Lower net revenues imply a higher
liquidity constraint, and hence an even higher productivity threshold to compensate.
These various elements determine the productivity threshold for exporting that holds
when ￿rms are liquidity-constrained, and hence the number of exporters and their entry and
exit into foreign markets. Some ￿rms, despite being productive enough to pro￿tably export
will be liquidity-constrained and will therefore not export if x(A) > xf. Proposition 1 states
the condition under which there will be a set of such ￿rms3, and for the remainder of this
paper, this assumption holds.
3This proposition is close to Chaney (2005)￿ s Proposition 1.
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of liquidity-constrained ￿rms that are prevented from pro￿tably exporting because they have
insu¢ cient liquidity, both exogenously and on the external ￿nancial market.
Proof. See appendix A.
Firms that have a very low productivity, below xd, will not even produce domestically.
Some ￿rms will be productive enough to produce domestically, but for which it will not
be pro￿table to export. Their productivity will be below xf. Firms whose productivity is
between xf and x(A) either have a too low exogenous liquidity shock A, or are not productive
enough to raise external ￿nance, or a combination of both. Firms with productivity above
x(A) have a su¢ ciently high A combined with a high enough productivity to both pay the
￿xed cost of exporting and pro￿tably export. Some even more productive ￿rms would be
able to export whatever the A they have, as they would be able to cover the whole ￿xed cost
of exporting with domestic pro￿ts and external ￿nance. Finally, the most productive ￿rms
need neither an exogenous liquidity shock A, nor access to external ￿nance, and exclusively
￿nance their ￿xed cost of exporting through domestic pro￿ts.
2.6 Destinations
In this section, the model is extended to the case in which there are more than two countries,
and each ￿rm in Home can decide to export to more than one destination.
In that case, it needs to pay the ￿xed cost of exporting to each of the destinations it
serves. Without credit constraints, all destinations to which a ￿rm could pro￿tably export
are served. However, with credit market imperfections, a ￿rm which has limited available
liquidity will only be able to pay the ￿xed cost of exporting to a certain number of countries.
On the external ￿nancing side, if a ￿rm decides to export to n destinations, then the available
collateral for each destination will be
tswCd
n . The exogenous liquidity and domestic pro￿ts
available for covering the ￿xed cost of serving each destination will be also divided by n.
In partial equilibrium analysis, in which the price index is taken as given and not a⁄ected
by the productivity thresholds that determine entry and exit of ￿rms, this yields the following
productivity threshold:
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In general equilibrium, domestic general price indices are determined in each country by
domestic producers, as approximated in equation (17). Assuming Cf is identical for all n
countries served, the productivity threshold for exporting to one of the foreign countries with
wage w￿ and cost Cf, given you are exporting to n ￿ 1 other countries is:
xn (A) =
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(23)
The productivity threshold for ￿rms to export will be increasing in the number of desti-
nations they decide to serve when ￿nancial markets are imperfect and ￿ < 1. The exogenous
9liquidity shock and the domestic tangible ￿xed assets used as collateral (and hence the avail-
able external ￿nance) will need to be shared to pay for the ￿xed costs of the n destinations
served. This will increase the productivity level needed to ensure higher domestic pro￿ts and
more external ￿nance will compensate for the additional need for liquidity.
Proposition 2 If the condition in Proposition 1 holds, there is a non-empty set of liquidity-
constrained ￿rms that are prevented from pro￿tably exporting to n destinations because they
have insu¢ cient liquidity, both exogenously and on the external ￿nancial market. As a result,
more productive and less credit-constrained ￿rms will export to more destinations.
Proof. Given the condition in Proposition 1 holds, x(A) > xf. In the absence of ￿nancial
constraints, with Cf common to all markets, xf does not vary across destinations, nor with
the number of destinations served. Hence any ￿rm productive enough to pro￿tably export
to one country will also be able to export to n destinations. This is not the case with
credit constraints. As x1 (A) = x(A) and
@xn(A)
@n > 0, the thresholds are such that xn (A) >
xn￿1 (A) > xn￿2 (A) > ::: > x2 (A) > x1 (A) > xf, hence the result.
Without considering entry and exit of ￿rms, whatever the number of destinations being
served, the productivity threshold for exporting to larger markets is lower, as can be seen
from equation (22). Net revenues for ￿rms exporting to such markets are also larger, which
means they will be less credit-constrained, all other things equal. The e⁄ect of the size of
the market needs to be balanced with that of iceberg trade costs: a very large market will be
less pro￿table if it is located far from the Home economy and that trade costs are therefore
higher. From equation (22) it is straightforward to show that:
@xn (A)
@
￿ L￿
￿￿￿1
￿ < 0 (24)
One can therefore order all potential destination markets according to L￿
￿￿￿1, their size
weighted by the iceberg cost that applies to them. This ordering will also correspond to the
pro￿ts derived from exporting to those countries: the higher L￿
￿￿￿1, the higher the pro￿t as
given by equation (13). This introduces a pecking order of trade:
Proposition 3 Firms will add export destinations in decreasing order of trade cost weighted
market size, L￿
￿￿￿1. More productive ￿rms will export to more destinations, but also to relatively
smaller markets.
Proof. See appendix B.
This result is similar to that of Manova (2006), except for the important trade cost
weighting dimension. It does not carry over directly to general equilibrium because of the
assumption made on prices. In the open equilibrium economy, thresholds will depend on
trade costs, but not on market size.
2.7 Exchange rate appreciation e⁄ect
An appreciation of the domestic currency with respect to the foreign currency means domestic
exporters are less competitive in the foreign market. As argued by Chaney (2005b), it also
relaxes the liquidity constraint faced by potential exporters given the ￿xed cost of exporting is
paid in foreign currency. The value of their domestic liquidity in terms of foreign currency, be
it domestic pro￿ts, exogenous cash ￿ ow or credit, has increased. Existing exporters export
less, but some new ￿rms enter the market. These entrants are liquidity-constrained ￿rms
who are productive enough to export. The liquidity e⁄ect dominated the competitiveness
e⁄ect, but the appreciation relaxes the constraint and allows them to start exporting. This
means that the extensive and intensive margin of exports to a given destination are a⁄ected
di⁄erently by an appreciation of the exchange rate. Exchange rate variations can be modelled
10as a shock on relative wages. As used by Atkeson and Burstein (2005), an increase in the
productivity in the homogeneous sector at home leads to an increase in the domestic wages,
and hence in the value of domestic assets (wA and ￿d(x)). In Foreign, pf(x)=P￿ increases,
re￿ ecting the loss of competitiveness of domestic exporters, as in the case of an appreciation
of the domestic currency.
Proposition 4 An appreciation of the exchange rate between the domestic and the foreign
currencies has three e⁄ects:
(1) Existing exporters become less competitive and reduce their exports
(2) The least productive existing exporters stop exporting
(3) The most productive constrained non-exporters start exporting
Proof. (1) The revenue, or total value of exports, of a ￿rm that is already an exporter in
Foreign and with productivity x is given by rf(x). In the presence of liquidity constraints,
plugging the productivity thresholds of equations (19), (20) and (21) with the price index in
equation (17) into the revenue equation (4), revenue is then equal to
rf (x) = ￿w￿C￿
d
￿
w￿
￿w
x
x￿
d
￿￿￿1
(25)
As domestic exporters face higher-priced inputs at home, they need to charge higher prices
in Foreign to maintain mark-ups, thus losing export market shares and reducing exports, as
can be seen from di⁄erentiating equation (25):
@rf(x)
@w
= ￿rf(x)
(￿ ￿ 1)
w
< 0
(2) As a consequence of (1), losing competitiveness also reduces the pro￿ts made in
Foreign. Given equation (13b) and the proof of (1),
@￿f(x)
@w
= ￿rf(x)
(￿ ￿ 1)
￿w
< 0
For the least productive ￿rms, as the ￿xed cost of entering foreign w￿Cf is unchanged,
exporting is no longer pro￿table. The productivity threshold xf given in equation (20)
increases, as
@xf
@w =
xf
w > 0
(3) An appreciation causes the exogenous liquidity and domestic pro￿ts to increase. This
facilitates the obtention of credit for a given productivity level and therefore relaxes the
liquidity constraint. Although pro￿ts in Foreign are reduced, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates when
the condition in Proposition 4.1 holds. As
@x(A)
@ w￿
w
> 0 (shown in appendix C ), x(A) decreases
and constrained exporters who were prevented from entering the foreign market are now able
to do so.
This means that an appreciation of the domestic currency, modelled as an increase in
domestic wages, will lead to entry and exit of exporters. Existing exporters with low produc-
tivity and no liquidity constraint lose competitiveness in the foreign market and exit. Given
they earn less pro￿ts, they are not able to cover the ￿xed cost, and this raises the produc-
tivity threshold for remaining on the export market. On the other hand, high productivity
￿rms that were kept out of foreign markets by their liquidity constraint will now be able
to enter. The appreciation implies that pro￿ts at home and the value of their tangible as-
sets are increased, thus reducing their liquidity constraint. These e⁄ects are similar to those
described in Chaney (2005b), although the third e⁄ect is slightly modi￿ed by the ￿nancial
market which is modelled here. In both cases, the presence of incomplete ￿nancial markets
and liquidity constraints implies that exports no longer depend only on the competitiveness
11of exporters. The cost of exporting relative to domestic assets is also important and it varies
with exchange rates.
We now turn to the empirical analysis in order to verify whether the model￿ s predictions
are con￿rmed in the data.
3 Data
3.1 The Belgian Balance Sheet and Trade Transaction Data
This dataset was presented in detail in Mußls and Pisu (2007). It merges ￿rm-level balance
sheet and trade data for Belgium. The balance sheet part of the BBSTTD is used to extract
￿rm-level annual characteristics, including employment, value added, ￿nancial situation, sec-
tor of activity and to compute total factor productivity. Only the export data side of the trade
data is used in this paper, and includes the destinations, products and value information4.
Manufacturing ￿rms only are selected as belonging to sectors 15 to 36 of the NACE-BEL
classi￿cation. Firms from sector 232 (re￿ned petroleum products) are excluded as their total
factor productivity (TFP) measures are strong outliers. Only ￿rms with more than one full-
time equivalent employee are kept in the dataset. The data is then merged into the Coface
database, described in the following subsection, and only ￿rms for which a Coface score is
given for each year a balance sheet was available is kept in the dataset. All observations are
kept in the dataset5, which is described in Table 5.
3.2 Measuring Credit Constraints: the Coface score
As a measure of credit constraints, the Coface Services Belgium Global Score for around
9,000 Belgian manufacturing ￿rms between 1999 and 2005 is used6. This section describes
the activities of Coface, the construction of the score, justi￿cation for using it as a measure for
credit constraints, and an external validation through its comparison with other techniques
found in the literature on credit constraints.
3.2.1 The Coface score
Coface International Established in France in 1945 as a credit insurance company, Coface
has grown in the past 15 years to become a world provider of services to facilitate business-to-
business trade. Besides o⁄ering receivables ￿nance and managing and collecting commercial
receivables for its clients, it also provides credit information and insurance services.
Through a worldwide network of credit information entities, it has constituted an inter-
national buyer￿ s risk database on 44 million companies. Data from public and private sources
are added to Coface￿ s internal data in order to manage each company￿ s rating and Coface￿ s
risk exposure on a continuous basis.
Based on this database, it can o⁄er credit insurance policies and therefore allows its clients
to tackle customer insolvency, bad debts, overdue accounts, commercial risks and political
risks when trading on credit terms. With the same database, it also provides its clients with
credit information on other ￿rms.
Within the Basel II framework for regulatory capital requirements, banks may choose to
compute their regulatory capital requirement through the internal ratings-based approach,
hence providing a measure of the probability of default for each borrowing company. There
4Given the di⁄erence of threshold for data to be available when a ￿rm exports within the EU and outside
the EU (see Mußls and Pisu, 2007), we do not consider as exporters ￿rms that export only outside the EU
and whose annual total of imports and exports is lower than 250,000 Euros.
5Note that in the BBSTTD, observations with a negative value-added or with less than one employee are
dropped.
6There are 62,569 year-￿rm observations. In 1999, 9,268 ￿rms, and in 2005, re￿ ecting the decline of
manufacturing reported in Mußls and Pisu (2007), only 8,411 ￿rms.
12has therefore been an incentive for credit insurance ￿rms such as Coface to also o⁄er their
services to banks who wish to outsource this measurement.
Why is it a good measure of credit constraints?
The Coface score, despite being constructed as a bankruptcy risk measure, is highly
correlated with how credit-constrained a ￿rm is. It will re￿ ect the same type of information
that a bank would use to decide whether it lends to a ￿rm. In some sense, by covering the
risk for its clients of trading with ￿rms that have a good score, Coface also provides these
￿rms with a form of extra liquidity through a short-term debt from their suppliers: it gives
a ￿rm the opportunity to pay for the goods or services provided by Coface￿ s client at a later
date. This is re￿ ected in the term ￿credit insurance￿ .
Although it is clearly endogenous to the ￿rm￿ s performance and characteristics, it is
not directly a⁄ected by its exporting behaviour, given that this is not public information in
Belgium and that it does not enter the Coface￿ s score determination model. Being determined
independently by a private ￿rm, the Coface score is therefore a very useful measure of credit
constraint for the purposes of this paper. It is unusual for such data to be available and
has a great advantage on measures of credit constraints used in the literature so far: it is
￿rm-speci￿c, varies through time on a yearly basis and allows for a measure of the degree of
credit constraint rather than classifying ￿rms between the two constrained or unconstrained
categories. Although the score is updated by Coface on a continuous basis, the data provided
by the company for this paper only reports the score of each ￿rm on 31 December.
The score is endogenous to some of the other ￿rm￿ s characteristics, as illustrated in
Figure (1). In the empirical section, the equilibrium relationships from the model will be
estimated, and no causality relation established. The model presented in the previous section
predicts that credit constraints are endogenous. The score contains information about the
credit constraints a ￿rm faces but also about its quality, performance and productivity. Two
￿rms with equally valuable projects, and identical pro￿tability and productivity can be very
di⁄erent in terms of ￿nancial health, board structure, and other elements that will determine
their score and their access to credit. The empirical analysis will therefore seek to control for
a number of variables that could potentially in￿ uence both the Coface score and the exporting
activity under study, such as size and productivity of ￿rms.
The Coface score is a well-suited direct measure of creditworthiness used by other ￿rms
and by banks when extending loans, and will be used in the empirical analysis to measure
how credit-constrained ￿rms are.
Construction of the score
As presented in Mitchell and Van Roy, 2007, there is a large academic literature on
bankruptcy prediction models such as that used to construct Coface￿ s score (Vivet, 2004, for
Belgium and see, for example, the review by Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). However, privately-
computed probability of default or credit scores such as Coface￿ s are naturally less well-
known. The aim of the score is to predict the risk of default of the ￿rm and therefore classify
￿rms between ￿healthy￿and ￿failing ￿rms￿ . The precise model used to compute the Coface
score is con￿dential, for obvious reasons. As summarised in Figure 1, it combines several
quantitative and qualitative inputs: ￿nancial statements (leverage, liquidity, pro￿tability,
size, etc.), industry-speci￿c variables, macro-economic variables such as industrial production,
legal form, age, geographical location, type of annual accounts (full or abbreviated), life cycle,
board structure, commercial premises, payments incidents, ONSS (social security) summons
and legal judgments.
These various inputs are combined using several statistical methods. This combination
has been constructed by a trial-and-error method, which is why no Coface data before 1999
is used.
The result is a score ranging from 3/20 to 19/20. Although the model predicts continuous
scores they are rounded to unity in the obtained data. The three categories used by Coface
are the ￿maximum mistrust￿ (3 to 6/20 inclusive), ￿temporary vulnerability￿ (7 to 9/20
inclusive) and ￿normal to strong con￿dence￿(10 to 19/20 inclusive).
13Figure 1: The Coface Score
Coface Score
Other elements:
- Sector
- Legal form
- Location
- Life cycle
- Board structure
- Commercial premises
- Payments incidents
- ONSS summons
- legal judgements
Credit constraints
Firm financial situation and performance
Exporting behavior
Selection of ￿rms with a score
Given there is no possibility for the moment to select which ￿rms￿scores are available,
below descriptive statistics are examined to see if there are any systematic di⁄erences between
￿rms with a Coface score and those without. Table 1 shows that ￿rms with a Coface score
are larger and more productive7. Exporting ￿rms with a score available export on average
more, more products and to more destinations. However, given the high correlation between
size and these variables, a Probit analysis is carried out for the year 2003.
Table 1: Comparison of ￿rms with or without available Coface score
No Coface score Coface score available
Mean sd Obs. se Mean sd Obs. se
Employment 12.95 123.28 39092 0.62 53.92 219.63 62416 0.88
Log of TFP Lev-Pet
9.95 1.31 37889 0.01 10.50 1.43 61655 0.01
Total export value
(in million Euros) 7.80 12.20 6819 0.15 12.53 16.42 29585 0.10
Number of
destinations 8.11 15.29 6819 0.19 13.51 23.16 29585 0.13
E
X
P
O
R
T
E
R
S
Number of products 8.22 58.37 6819 0.71 16.59 102.92 29585 0.60
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufactur ing firms from the BBSTTD in 99 three-digit
sectors for the year s 1999 to 2005 . The first four columns depict firms that  have no Coface score available.The
firm is however in the BBSTTD (with balance sheet information, more than one employee and potentially trade
data) for that year. The Coface score is a credit-rating score constructed foreach year and each firm by Coface. In
the four last  columns, the score is  available. Only firms for whic h a score is available for each year they file  a
balance sheet over the period are kept in the sample. The mean, standard deviation (sd), number of observations
(Obs.) and standard error of the means (se) are reported for the following variables. Employmen t represents the
number of full -time equivalent employees, “ Log of TFP Lev -Pet”  is the logarithm of Total Factor Productivity
calculated according toLevinsohn and Petrin's (2003) meth od. The last three rows compare exporters in each
category, comparing the total value of their exports, the number of destinations they serve and the number of
products they export.
7Their mean employment and mean productivity are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those of ￿rms with no
Coface score available, as can be seen by the size of the standard errors.
14The results are reported in Table 2. Larger ￿rms in terms of employees numbers are
more likely to be included in the sample. This is not surprising given the nature of the
score and the composition of the BBSTTD. In comparison to other papers in the literature
(e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 2004), the requirement for all ￿rms in Belgium to ￿le a balance
sheet implies that the annual accounts dataset contains a high proportion of very small ￿rms.
Despite the bias introduced by selecting only ￿rms with a score, the resulting dataset remains
representative of the Belgian economy in terms of sector composition, employment and value
added growth8. Besides, Table 2 shows that once size of the ￿rm is controlled for, there are
no systematic di⁄erences between ￿rms that are in the sample and those outside, given that
the coe¢ cients on productivity and export characteristics are not signi￿cant. So, there is no
bias to be taken into account in the empirical analysis as long as size is controlled for.
Table 2: Probit analysis of inclusion in the Coface sample
Dependent variable: 0/1 dummy: 1 = Firm with Coface score available
0= no score available
(1) (2)
Log (employment) 0.768** 0.377**
(0.022) (0.025)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet) -0.013
(0.013)
Exporter –  non-Exporter dummy -0.046
(0.031)
Log (total exports) -0.008
(0.013)
Log (number of destinations exported) 0.007
(0.031)
Log (number of products exported) -0.024
(0.025)
Observations 13924 5126
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufac turing firms from the BBSTTD in 99 three-digit
sectors for the year 2003 .  Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level;
* denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant,
not reported. The dependent variable is thea dummy equal to 1 if a credit rating score constructedfor each firm by
Coface is available in 2003 . The dummy is equal to 0 if the firm is in the BBSTTD (with balance sheet information,
more than one employee and potentially trade data) , but no sc ore is available. Only firms for whic h a sc ore is
available for each year they file  a balance sheet over the period are kept in the sample. Log (x) is the logarithm of
variable  x . “ TFP  Lev -Pet”   is  Total  Factor  Produ ctivity  calculated  according  t o  Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003)
method. “ Exporter-non Exporter”  is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports in 2003, and equal to 0 if not.
3.2.2 External validation
Having described the construction of the Coface score, this section now shows how it is
correlated to ￿rm fundamentals and how it is related to higher debt. It also relates it to the
important literature on credit constraints in corporate ￿nance.
Correlation with ￿rm fundamentals Given the methodology used to construct the
score is not available publicly, it is shown here how correlated the score is with the ￿rm￿ s
￿nancial situation and productivity. A selection of ￿nancial ratios (Lagneaux and Vivet,
2006) measures each ￿rm￿ s solvency, liquidity, pro￿tability and investment.
Pro￿tability is measured with the return on equity (ROE) ratio, net pro￿t after tax
over equity capital. It re￿ ects the return to be expected by shareholders once all expenses
8In 2004, the ￿rms with a score available represented 87.73 p.c. of total employment in manufacturing
￿rms and 87.9 p.c. of total value added produced by manufacturing ￿rms. It also contributed by 152 p.c. to
the increase in total value added, while ￿rms not included in the Coface sample reduced the total value added
by 50 p.c.
15and taxes have been deducted. It is widely used in the literature as an indicator of ￿rm
performance (see, for instance, Gorton and Schmid, 2000).
Table 3: The correlation between the score and ￿nancial ratios and productivity
Dependent variable: Score
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Return on equity -0.395**
(0.033)
Financial independence 5.267**
(0.114)
Borrowings coverage 0.638**
(0.075)
Broad liquidity 0.319**
(0.019)
Investment ratio 80.381**
(9.268)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet) 1.155** 0.056+
(0.029) (0.034)
Log (employment) 0.660** 0.734** 0.667** 0.734** 0.686** 0.363** 0.650**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.016) (0.044)
Observations 61237 61245 61190 61185 60114 61655 61655
Number of firms 10525 10452 10500 10485 10453 10477
R-squared 0.08 0.30 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.01
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES NO YES
Sector fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Fixed-effect OLS regression (“ Within”  estimator) .  The  dataset  is  an  unbalanced  panel  of  Belgian
manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available and includes an averag e of 8,926 firms
pe r  y ea r  i n 9 9 three-digit sectors over the period 1999 to 2005. Robust standard errors in parentheses; +
denotes statistical signific ance at the 10% level; * denotes statistic al significance at the 5% level; ** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant and 3 -digit sector and year dummies, not reported.
T h e  r a t i o s  a r e  d e f i n e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  R e t u r n  o n  E q u i t y  =  N e t  p r o f i t  a f t e r  t a x  /  E q u i t y  c a p i t a l ;  F i n a nc i a l
independence = Equity capital / Total liabilities; Coverage of borrowings  by cash flow = C ash flow / (Debt
+ Reserves + Deferred tax); Liquidity "in the broad sense" = (Total assets–  Long-term Loans) / Short-term
liabilities; Investment ratio = Acquisitions o f tangible fixed assets / Valueadded. The extreme observations
(top and bottom percentile) for each ratioacross all years are removed for the corr esponding regression.
L o g  ( TFP  Lev -Pet)  i s  t h e  l o g a r i t h m  o f  a  m e a s u r e  o f Total  Factor  Productivity  measured  according  to
Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method, for more details see main text in following sectionLog (employment)
is the logarithm of employment, and makes it possible to control for the size of firms. The dependent variable
is the credit rating score constructed for each year and each firm by Coface and ranges from3 to 19. Only
firms for whic h a sc ore is avail able for  each  year they  file a balance sheet over the period are kept in the
sample. The variation in the number of observations is due to firms not reporting some of the variables used
in the calculation of agiven ratio in their balance sheet.
Solvency is measured with two ratios, ￿nancial independence and coverage of borrowings
by cash ￿ ow. These summarise the ￿rm￿ s ability to meet its short- and long-term ￿nancial
liabilities. Financial independence is the ratio between equity capital and total liabilities. It
also re￿ ects how independent the ￿rm is of borrowings. The coverage of borrowings by cash
￿ ow measures the ￿rm￿ s repayment capability, and its converse speci￿es the number of years
it would take to repay its debts assuming its cash ￿ ow were constant.
Liquidity ￿in the broad sense￿ratio is used to assess the ￿rm￿ s ability to repay its short-
term debts. It divides total assets realisable and available by short￿ term liabilities.
Investment is assessed by computing the rate of investment and acquisitions of tangible
￿xed assets over value added for the year.
As shown in Table 3, the Coface score is correlated with all these ratios, con￿rming it
re￿ ects the ￿nancial situation. The negative coe¢ cient of the return on equity corresponds
to a very low beta coe¢ cient9 (-0.015) compared to the other ratios (for example, 0.47
for ￿nancial independence). Also called standardised coe¢ cients, the beta coe¢ cents are
computed by standardising the variables so that they have a variance of 1. The betas measure
the e⁄ects on the dependent variable of the di⁄erent independent variables. They allow the
9The beta coe¢ cients are not presented in the table and were computed separately.
16comparison of the importance of the independent variables even when these are measured
in di⁄erent units. Liquidity and solvability therefore appear to be more important elements
than pro￿tability in determining a ￿rm￿ s access to credit. Firm and year ￿xed e⁄ects are
included in the OLS regression, thus also controlling for possible di⁄erences in, for example,
risk premia across industries and years which might a⁄ect the Coface score and other ￿nancial
measures di⁄erentially. Such controls will be included in many other regressions in the paper.
Score and productivity This subsection also presents the correlation between credit con-
straints and productivity, the two determinants in the model￿ s framework of ￿rms￿export
decisions. Measuring productivity is prone to several problems that have been dealt with in
di⁄erent ways in the literature. The method used throughout this paper, as in Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003), measures TFP using materials as a proxy rather than investment, thus
reducing the number of zero-observations often noted in the data for investment compared
to materials10.
In Table 3, the Coface score is regressed on productivity, controlling for size, and including
separate speci￿cations with sector and ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ect in the two last columns. Score is
positively but not perfectly correlated with productivity, con￿rming that credit constraints
and productivity are two di⁄erent issues to be considered when analysing export behaviour.
This is also illustrated in Figure 2, which shows there is no clear positive relationship between
the score and the ￿rm￿ s productivity.
Figure 2: Total Factor Productivity and Score (2005)
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score
available in each year they file in a balance sheet over the period and includes an average of 8,926 firms per  year in 99
three-digit sectors over the period 1999 to 2005. This figure plots 8,395 firms for the year 2005. On the horizontal axis,
the credit rating score is reported, constructed for each year and each firm by Coface and ranges from 3 to 19. The
vertical axis measures the logarithm of Total Factor Productivity computed according to Levinsohn and Petrin’ s (2003)
method.
Dividend Payout and Total Assets The e⁄ects of ￿nancial constraints on ￿rm behaviour
are an important area of research in corporate ￿nance. Compared with existing literature, the
Coface score provides many advantages. It is a direct measure of the credit ratings of ￿rms,
10The results presented below are robust to using alternative measures of Total Factor Productivity.
17which is used by banks and other ￿rms when they decide to extend credit or not. Adapted
according to the most recent information available and including many determinants, it is
available for each year. Finally, it not only classi￿es ￿rms between constrained and non-
constrained, but provides a precise scale of the creditworthiness of the ￿rm.
One of the many approaches in the literature consists of sorting ￿rms into ￿nancially-
constrained and unconstrained types on a yearly basis by ranking ￿rms according to their
payout dividend ratio (Cleary, 1999). As in Almeida et al (2004) and based on the intuition
in Fazzari et al. (1988), ￿rms in the top three deciles would be considered as less ￿nancially-
constrained than ￿rms in the bottom three. Also, considering size as a good observable
measure of credit constraints based on Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and as in Almeida
et al. (2004), ranking can be made according to total assets (Allayannis and Mozumdar,
2004). Testing whether such classi￿cations imply a larger score for unconstrained ￿rms, the
results are presented in Table 4. In the two alternative classi￿cation criteria, it appears that
unconstrained ￿rms will have a signi￿cantly higher average score than ￿nancially-constrained
ones. The means are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one another, as can be noted from the
standard errors. This con￿rms that the Coface score o⁄ers a creditworthiness measure that
is consistent with the existing literature.
Table 4: Score of ￿nancially-constrained and unconstrained ￿rms according to dividend pay-
out ratio and total assets
Score Mean SE Max Min N
Dividend payout
Constrained 13.52 .054 19 3 3074
Unconstrained 14.12 .048 19 3 3073
Total assets
Constrained 10.33 .028 19 3 18762
Unconstrained 13.00 .027 19 3 18767
Notes:  T h e  d a t a s e t  i s  a n  u n b a l a nc e d  p a n e l  of  Belgian  manufacturing  firms  from  the
BBSTTD with Coface score available  and includes an average of 8 ,926 firms per year in 99
three-digit sectors over the period 1999 to 2005.  The c redit rating sc ore c onstruc ted for
each year and each firm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. Its mean, standard error, maximum
and minimum observations are  reported for the different  categories defined. Using the
dividend payout criterion, only firms whose dividend payout is positive are included, which
is why there is a difference in the number of observations. Firms whose dividend payoutis
in the top 30 percentiles are considered as financially unconstrained, whereas those in the
bottom 30 percentiles are financially constrained. The same is done with total assets. The
mean test is passed, meaning that constrained firms have a lower score than unconstrained
firms, in both criteria. This is robust to using only one cross -section of the data, or taking
out observations within the top and bottom percentiles of each measure.
4 Empirical results
In this section the predictions of the model will be tested on the Belgian dataset. It should
be noted that the necessary and simplifying assumption made in equation 17 that prices are
set domestically does not apply perfectly to an open economy such as Belgium, used in the
empirical section below. However, the predictions of the model tested in this section remain
valid.
4.1 The e⁄ect of credit constraints on the export status, destinations, total
exports, and products.
As a ￿rst prediction of the model, it would be expected that ￿rms that are less credit-
constrained are more likely to be exporters. This appears in the descriptive statistics pre-
18sented in Table 5: on average, exporters are not only signi￿cantly larger and more produc-
tive, they also have a signi￿cantly higher score, meaning they are more creditworthy and less
liquidity-constrained.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Non-Exporters Exporters
Mean sd Obs. se Mean sd Obs. se
Employment 15.89 31.11 33425 0.17 97.45 314.65 29036 1.85
Log of TFP Lev-Pet 10.23 1.10 32769 0.01 10.80 1.66 28860 0.01
Score 11.06 3.78 33425 0.02 12.32 3.84 29036 0.02
Number of
destinations 12.74 16.48 29036
Number of products 13.75 23.32 29036
Total export value
(in million Euros) 16.90 104.0 29036
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with
Coface score available and includes an average of 8,926 firms per year in 99 three-digit sectors over
the  period  1999  to  2005.Observations  are  at  the  firm -year  level. The  credit  rating  score
c onstr uc te d f or  e ac h y ea r  a nd e ac h f i r m by  C of ac e  ra nge s f r om 3   to  19.The means, standard
deviations, numbers of observations andstandard errors of meansare reported for the different
variables and categories defined. Exporters are firms that were exporting a positive amount in that
year. Non-exporters were exporting zero in t hat year.
This is con￿rmed when considering the coe¢ cients of ￿rm characteristics e⁄ect on the
probability of exporting in a given year from the linear probability model in levels reported
in Table 6. The whole sample of ￿rms for which a Coface score is available in each year
it has ￿led a balance sheet is included. Given the number of ￿xed e⁄ects to be included
in the speci￿cation, using a linear probability model addresses the incidental parameters
problem that a⁄ects non-linear ￿xed-e⁄ects estimates. This speci￿cation is used in Bernard
and Jensen (2004) for a very similar binary choice problem despite the problems this might
provoke (e.g. predicted probabilities outside the 0-1 range). Dummies for three-digit industry
and year are included, and control for lagged (one year) size and a measure of productivity:
total factor productivity (as in Levinsohn and Petrin). Controlling for these observables
and given the composition of the score described above, the residual is a good measure of
credit constraints faced by a ￿rm. Larger and more productive ￿rms are more likely to be
exporting. The ￿rst column replicates the result previously found in the literature that more
productive ￿rms are more likely to export. The coe¢ cient on the lagged score is positive
and signi￿cant in column (2), con￿rming that ￿rms which are less credit-constrained have a
higher probability of being exporters. In that speci￿cation, the coe¢ cient on productivity is
not reduced compared to the ￿rst column, indicating the score captures the additional e⁄ect
of credit constraints. The score is also included in column (3) which augments the model with
an interaction term between the lagged score and lagged TFP. Probably due to the correlation
between productivity and the score which reduces the signi￿cance of the variables, the result
is not as predicted by the model. The positive e⁄ect of a higher credit score on the probability
to be an exporter is not diminished with a higher productivity. When including the lagged
export status variable, as in Bernard and Jensen (2004), the results carry through although
the positive coe¢ cient on the score is not signi￿cant, as shown in columns (4) and (5). This
is probably due to ￿rms￿scores not varying much through time, as creditworthiness might
not change greatly from year to year. It could also point to the results of the model showing
that credit constraints should have no impact on a ￿rm￿ s exporting status in a given year if
it was already an exporter in the previous year as the ￿xed cost of starting to export would
have already been borne.
19Table 6: Linear probability model on exporter status
0/1 Dummy non-exporter/exporter Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (Score (t-1)) 0.027** 0.016 0.004 0.001
(0.005) (0.035) (0.003) (0.004)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) 0.090** 0.087** 0.085** 0.013** 0.026**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1))
x Log (Score (t-1))
0.001
(0.003)
Exporter/non-exp. (t-1) 0.782** 0.106**
(0.004) (0.010)
Log (empl.) (t-1) 0.143** 0.142** 0.142** 0.032** 0.067**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Observations 50824 50824 50824 50824 50824
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.74 0.02
Number of firms 10080
Firm fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES NO
Notes: Linear Probability regression in levels for columns (1) to (3) and with firm fixed effect  (“ Within”
estimator) for column (4). The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the
BBSTTD with Coface score available or each  year they file in a balance sheet over the period and
includes an averageof 8,926 firms per year in99 three-digit sectors over the period 1999 to 2005. Robust
standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statisti cal significance at the  10% level; * denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant and 3 -
digit sector and year dummies, not reported. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating wh ether the
firm exports or not in that year. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year. Log
(x) is the logarithm of variable x. The credit rating score, constructed for each year and each firm by
Coface ranges from  3  to 1 9 .  L og (e mpl.) is the logarithm of employment, and makes it possible to
control for the size of firms. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of Total Factor Productivity calculated according
to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method. For column (3 ), the interaction between produc tivity and the
score is used as an explanatory  variable. In columns (4) and (5), the lagged dependent variable, a dummy
indicating export activity in the previous year, is also included.
As regards destinations, Proposition 2 considers the number of destinations served by a
￿rm as being positively related to its productivity and negatively to credit constraints. This
is con￿rmed in the OLS regression with ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects in the ￿rst column of Table 7, where
it appears that the lagged score a⁄ects positively and signi￿cantly the number of markets
served by a ￿rm, while the positive coe¢ cient on productivity is signi￿cant11. Going beyond
the model, it is also established in Table 7 that this result is also true when looking at total
exports and products. The number of products exported seems to be less dependent on credit
constraints (the positive coe¢ cient is only statistically signi￿cant at the 10.2% level) than
the number of destinations.
11This is robust to using the logarithm of labour productivity measured by value added per employee, rather
than TFP.
20Table 7: Total exports, destinations and products
Log (Number of
destinations)
Log (Total exports) Log (Number of
products exported) Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Log (Score (t-1)) 0.036** 0.088** 0.024+
(0.011) (0.026) (0.014)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) 0.028** 0.147** 0.028*
(0.010) (0.024) (0.011)
Log (Employment (t-1)) 0.311** 0.757** 0.314**
(0.019) (0.047) (0.023)
Observations 22137 22137 22137
Number of firms 4972 4972 4972
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.02
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes:  Fixed-effect  OLS  regressions  (“ Within”  estimator) .  The  dataset  is  an  unbalanced  panel  of
Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available or each year they file in a
balance sheet over the period and includes an average of 8,926 firms per year in 99 three-digit sectors
over the period 1999 to 2005. Only observations in which the firm is exporting are kept. Robust
standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical
signific ance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistic al significance at the 1% level. Inc ludes c onstant and
year dummies, not reported. The dependent variables are the logarithms of the number of destinations
served  (column  (1)),of total  exports  (column  (2))  and of  the number  of  different  8 -digit  (CN
nomenclature) products exported (column (3)) by a firm in one year. (t -1) indicates the  explanatory
variable has been lagged by one year.Log (x) is the logarithm of variable x. The  credit rating score,
constructed for each year and each firm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. Log (empl.) is the logarithm of
employment, and makes it possible to control for the size of firms. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of Total
Factor Productivity calculated according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method.
These results clearly establish the relationship that exists between credit constraints and
exporting behaviour, even once productivity and size are controlled for. They con￿rm the
equilibrium relationship identi￿ed in the model holds empirically. The next section aims at
improving these results by analysing the interactions through time.
4.2 The e⁄ects of credit constraints over time
4.2.1 Becoming an exporter
In order to assess the importance of credit constraints in the decision to start exporting,
Table 8 reports the e⁄ects of lagged ￿rm characteristics on the probability of being a new
exporter. New exporters are de￿ned as ￿rms that have not exported in any of the three
previous years of the sample. Firms that export throughout the sample are excluded, as are
those observations for new exporters in subsequent years. The alternative to being a new
exporter is a ￿rm that does not export that year. A linear probability estimator with year
and ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects is used to estimate the probability of starting to export, with TFP
and employment as explanatory variables. Productivity a⁄ects positively the probability of
becoming an exporter the following year. When including the lagged score as a measure of
credit constraints, its e⁄ect is insigni￿cantly positive, and the coe¢ cients on the other two
variables are unchanged.
21Table 8: New exporters
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: 0/1 Dummy
new exporter
0/1 Dummy
new exporter
Log (Score (t-1)) 0.003
(0.004)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) 0.010* 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004)
Log (Employment (t-1)) 0.024** 0.024**
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 25757 25757
R-squared 0.02 0.02
Firm fixed effects YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES
Notes: Fixed-effect OLS regressions (“ Within”estimator). The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian
manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available for each year they file in a balance
sheet over the period and includes an average of 8,926 firms per year in 99 three -digit sectors over the
period 1999 to 2005. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10%
level; * denotes statistical significance at the  5% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Includes constant and 3-digit sector and year dummies, not reported. The dependent variable is a dummy
indicating whether the firm is a new exporter or not in that year. Being a new exporter is defined as a
firm that did not export in anyof the threeprevious years in the sample and did export that year. Firms
that export every year in the sample are dropped. Firms that were new exporters in a previous year are
dropped. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year.Log (x) is the logarithm of
variable x. The credit rating score, constructed for each year and each fir m by Coface ranges from 3 to
19. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of Total Factor Productivity measured according to Levinsohn and Petrin's
(2003) method. Log (Employment) is the logarithm of employment, andmakes it possible to control for
the size of firms.
One potential explanation for this result is that ￿rms that have never exported and start
exporting do not use external credit to overcome the ￿xed cost of exporting to their ￿rst
destination. They will rely instead on internal liquidity, corresponding to the exogenous
liquidity shock in the theoretical model. It may also be the case that Belgium being an
open and small country, starting to export close to its borders is not very costly for ￿rms,
compared to the ￿xed cost of expanding to markets further away. This is why the next section
concentrates on export destinations.
4.2.2 Extensive and intensive margin for destinations
Having considered the decision on starting to export, the e⁄ect of credit constraints on the
decision to export to more destinations is now examined. This is the extensive margin of
exports to a given destination. According to the theoretical model, credit constraints should
matter for the decision of existing exporters to start exporting to a new country. It should not,
however, a⁄ect the value of exports per destination or its subsequent increases, namely the
intensive margin. Adopting a linear probability speci￿cation, the probability of an exporter
increasing the number of countries it serves is positively a⁄ected by size, productivity and
a higher score (and hence weaker credit constraints). Once ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects are controlled
for, as reported in the ￿rst column of Table 9, only the coe¢ cient on the score remains
signi￿cantly positive. When compared to the results presented in the previous section, this
would suggest that credit constraints are more important in determining the increase in
the number of destinations served than in explaining the decision to start exporting. The
table also reports in the OLS regression of the second column that the actual increase in
the number of destinations served relative to the previous year is also positively related to
creditworthiness. Turning to the intensive margin of trade to a given destination, it appears in
the third column of Table 9 that credit constraints have no e⁄ect on the increase in the value
of exports to a given destination, as the coe¢ cient on the lagged Coface score is insigni￿cant.
22This is consistent with the results of the model, as credit constraints a⁄ect the ability of ￿rms
to cover the ￿xed cost of exporting to an additional destination. Once the ￿xed cost has been
borne, the amount exported to that destination is not dependent on the availability of credit.
The negative coe¢ cients on productivity and employment when ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects are
included, though not very signi￿cant in the ￿rst column, are surprising. They could re￿ ect
the fact that it is the smallest and less productive exporters that expand their number of
destinations and value per destination most, while other more successful exporters are already
well established in the di⁄erent countries they serve.
Table 9: The extensive and intensive margins per destination
Increase in number of destinations
Dependent variable: 0/1 Dummy
no increase/
increase
Increase in Log
(Number of
destinations served)
Increase in
logarithm of mean
value per destination
(1) (2) (3)
Log (Score (t-1)) 0.038* 0.037** 0.034
(0.017) (0.014) (0.028)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) -0.006 -0.022* -0.091**
(0.012) (0.010) (0.021)
Log (Employment) (t-1) -0.035+ -0.037+ -0.116**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.039)
Observations 20097 19835 20097
Number of firms 4889 4827 4889
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: Linear Probability (column (1)) and OLS (columns (2) and (3)) regressions with firm fixed
effect (“ Within”  estimator) . The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing  firms
from the BBSTTD with Coface score available or each year they file in a balance sheet over the
period and includes an averageof 8,926 firms per year in 99 three-digit sectors over the period
1999 to 2005. Only observations in w hich the firm is exporting are kept. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at
the  5%  level;  **  denotes  statistical  significance  at  the  1%  level.  Includes  constant  and year
dummies, not reported. The first column's dependent variable is a dummy equal to 0 if the firm
did  not  increase  the  number  of  destination  it  exports  to  relative  to  the  previous  year.  The
dependent variable for column two is the increase in thelogarithm of the number of destinations
relative to the previous year. The first year a firm starts exporting is dropped from the sample. In
column  (3),  the  dependent  variable  is  the  increase  in  the  logarithm  of  the  mean  value  per
destination. This mean value isper firm, per year, how much (in Euros) it exports on average to
each of its destinations. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year.Log
indicates the logarithm of the variable has been used. The credit rating score, constructed  for each
year  and e ach firm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. TFP  Lev -Pet is  a measure of Total Factor
Productivity measured according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method. Log (Employment) is
the logarithm of employment, and makes it possible to control for the size of firms.
4.3 Pecking order of trade
Proposition 3 shows how ￿rms will follow a pecking order of trade when adding export
destinations to their portfolio: more productive ￿rms will export to more destinations, as
shown above, and to smaller markets (weighted by the trade cost). This result holds in the
data, as presented in Table 10. The trade cost weighted market size of each country in each
year of the sample is constructed as the Gross Domestic Product12, divided by a measure of
distance from Belgium. GDP is taken as a proxy for L￿, the market size in the model, as it
represents the market potential of a country. Distance is taken as a measure of trade costs, as
12The data used is that of the US Census Bureau International Database (www.census.org).
23it will be more costly for ￿rms to ship goods to markets that are further away. Following Head
and Mayer (2002) and Mayer and Zignano (2006), the distance is weighted by the geographic
distribution within the country. This is measured by the share of the main city￿ s population
in the country￿ s population and will re￿ ect the trade cost of reaching the consumers around
the country. For a given GDP, the further the country, the smaller its trade cost weighted
market size. Similarly, between two equidistant markets, the larger in terms of GDP will be
of a bigger size. For each ￿rm in each year, the smallest market it exports to is selected, as
an indicator of how far down the pecking order a ￿rm is situated. The logarithm of the trade
cost weighted market size of that country is the dependent variable. The ￿rst speci￿cation
in Table 10, an OLS regression with sector and year ￿xed e⁄ect shows how more productive
￿rms export to smaller countries. The second column shows this result is robust to including
￿nancial constraints: less credit-constrained ￿rms will go further down the pecking order of
trade. When introducing ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects in the third column, the e⁄ects of productivity
and credit constraints are no longer signi￿cant, yet this is probably due to ￿rms not varying
strongly from year to year the furthest market they manage to reach.
These results con￿rm that the equilibrium relationship between productivity, credit con-
straints and market potentials of destinations identi￿ed in Proposition 3 of the model holds
in the data.
Table 10: Market size, productivity and credit constraints
Log (GDP/Weighted Distance) of smallest destination
(1) (2) (3)
Log (Score (t-1)) -0.102* -0.044
(0.051) (0.050)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) -0.494** -0.483** -0.033
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040)
Log (Employment) (t-1) -0.603** -0.600** -0.523**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.066)
Observations 20026 20026 20026
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.01
Number of firms 4882
Firm fixed effects NO NO YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES NO
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regressions, with firm fixed effect (“ Within”estimator) for the third specification in
column (3). The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD
with Coface score available or each year they file in a balance sheet over the period and includes an
average of  8 ,926 f i r ms pe r  ye ar  i n 99  three -digit sector s over the period 1999 to 2005. Only
observations in which the firm is exporting are kept. Robust standard errors in par entheses; +
denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; **
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant and year  and sec tor dummies, not
reported. The dependent variable for all three regressions is the logarithm of the GDP-distan ce
ratio, where the distance is weighted according to the share of the main city’ s population in the
country’ s total population. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year. Log
indicates the logarithm of the variable has been used. The credit rating score, constructed for each
year  and e ach firm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. TFP  Lev -Pet is  a measure of Total Factor
Productivity measured according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method. Log (Employment) is
the logarithm of employment, and makes it possible to control for the size of firms. Source: GDP
from US Census Bureau International Data, Weighted distance from CEPII.
4.4 Exchange rates
The last result of the theoretical section of this paper relates to credit constraints and the
sensitivity of trade ￿ ows to relative wage ￿ uctuations. An increase in domestic relative to
foreign wages corresponds to a loss of competitiveness of domestic exporters, as would occur
following a domestic currency appreciation. The e⁄ects of exchange rates on aggregate trade
24￿ ows have been shown in the literature to be mostly insigni￿cant (see McKenzie (1999) for
a overview). However, as shown in Proposition 4 of the model presented in section 1, this
could be due to various e⁄ects at play at the ￿rm level that cancel each other out in the
aggregate. The ￿rst e⁄ect of a domestic currency appreciation (depreciation) with respect
to a given country is that existing exporters to that destination will respond with a decrease
(increase) in their volume of exports. This is tested in the data by selecting ￿rms that
already exported in the previous year to a given destination, and considering their response
to a change in exchange rates. The results are reported in the ￿rst column of Table 11.
Controlling for productivity and size, an appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency
decreases (increases) the market shares of existing exporters to a given destination, as put
forward by point (i) of Proposition 4. This is robust to controlling for credit constraints, as
the score￿ s e⁄ect is then insigni￿cant and doesn￿ t a⁄ect the other variables￿coe¢ cients.
The second e⁄ect of an appreciation is that the least productive exporters to that country
can no longer export pro￿tably and are consequently forced out of the market. A depreciation
would rather make those exporters gain competitiveness and reinforce their position in that
market, which is why we only consider appreciation episodes. In the data, one can compare
the productivity of ￿rms that keep on exporting to a given destination, even after a domestic
currency appreciation episode, with that of ￿rms which stop exporting. The result of a linear
probability model with ￿xed e⁄ects is presented in Table 11￿ s second column. Productivity at
the ￿rm and year level is summarised by a dummy re￿ ecting low productivity, as it is equal to
one when Total Factor Productivity is lower than the year-three-digit-sector median. Being
of the low productivity type will increase the probability of an exporter exiting the market
it used to serve following a domestic currency appreciation episode vis-￿-vis this country￿ s
currency.
The third e⁄ect presented in point (iii) of Proposition 4 is that the most productive non-
exporters that could not start exporting because they were liquidity-constrained will now
be able to do so, because the ￿xed entry cost has decreased in terms of domestic currency.
This is tested by considering only appreciation episodes, given that with a depreciation of
the domestic currency, the ￿xed cost would increase. Existing exporters are more likely to
start exporting to a destination whose exchange rate has depreciated (i.e. for Belgian ￿rms,
the euro has appreciated) in the past year if they were productive but credit-constrained in
the previous year. This is shown in the last column of Table 11 where the dependent variable
is a dummy that is equal to one when the ￿rm started exporting to at least one destination
that experienced an exchange rate depreciation with respect to the previous year. It is equal
to zero if the ￿rm, an existing exporter, did not add to its portfolio of served markets any
destination with an exchange rate depreciation episode relative to the previous year. Credit-
constrained ￿rms are those whose score is lower than the three-digit-sector-year median.
They are less likely to start exporting following a domestic currency appreciation. This is
re￿ ected in the signi￿cantly negative coe¢ cient on the credit constraint dummy. The positive
and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the interaction between TFP and credit constraint re￿ ects the
relationship shown in the theoretical model that the most productive of the constrained ￿rms
are now less credit-constrained and able to overcome the ￿xed cost of pro￿tably exporting
to those destinations. Note that in all three columns of Table 11 , and as in Table 9, the
coe¢ cient for productivity is negative and signi￿cant. As mentioned above, this could be due
to smaller and less productive ￿rms expanding their exports most, and should be explored in
future research.
These results con￿rm that the last proposition of the theoretical model is not contradicted
by the data when considering the relationship between exchange rate movements and ￿rm-
level exporting behaviour.
25Table 11: E⁄ect of exchange rate movements on ￿rm-level export patterns
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable:
Change in
logarithm of
value exported
per destination
0/1 dummy: 1 = exit
from a given
destination
0= continues
exporting to a given
destination
0-1 dummy of starting
to export to at least
one destination with
recent Euro
appreciation
% change in exchange rate -0.234+
(0.129)
Low productivity dummy 0.047*
(0.018)
Credit constrained (t-1) -1.456**
(0.029)
Log( TFP Lev-Pet) x constrained (t-1) 0.112**
(0.002)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) -0.027** -0.069**
(0.010) (0.012)
Log (Employment (t-1)) -0.019 -0.163** -0.034
(0.020) (0.026) (0.021)
Observations 182914 13869 14172
R-squared 0.00 0.08 0.24
Number of firms 4457 2758 3707
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Destination fixed effects YES YES NO
Notes:  Fixed-effect OLS regressions (“ Within”  estimator). The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian
manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available or each year they file in a balance sheet
over the period and includes an average of 8,926 firms per year in 99 three-digit sectors over the period 1999
to 2005. Only observations in which the firm is exporting are kept. Exchange rate data is obtained from the
National Bank of Belgium Belgostat database. + denotes s tatistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes
statistical significance at the  5% level; ** denotes statistical significance  at the 1% level. Includes  constant,
destination  and  year  dummies,  not  reported. TFP  Lev -P e t  i s  a  m e a s u r e  o f  T o ta l  F a c t o r  P r o d uctivity
measured  according  to  Levinsohn  and  Petrin's  (2003)  method.  Log  (Employment)  is  the  logarithm  of
employment, and makes it possible to control for the size of firms.
In the first column, the dependent variable is the change with respect to the prev ious year in the logarithm of
the value exported to a given destination, if the firm already exported there the previous year. Cases in which
it  is  a  new  destination  the  firm  exports  to  are  dropped.  The  result  is  robust  to  dropping  Euro -zone
destinations i n whi c h the  exc ha nge  ra te  di d not va ry .  C l uster e d (ye ar  x  de sti na ti on) sta nda r d er r or s ar e
reported in parenthesis.
In the second column, destinations are only kept for the years they have experienced an appreciation vis -à-vis
the Euro. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable reflects firm exit from a market. It is
a dummy set to 1 if the firm had been exporting to the given destination for at least two years and stopped for
that year and the following year at least. If they are still exporting to the given destination that year and the
following the dummy is set to 0. Other observations are dropped. The “ low productivity dummy”explanatory
variable is a dummy set equal to 1 when the TFP measure à la Levinsohn and Petrin is below the ye ar and
three digit sector median, and zero otherwise. The result is robust to using the TFP measure itself.
In the third  column, as in the second, destinations -years are only kept if the Euro has experienced an
appreciation vis-à-vis its exchange rate. Rob ust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a
dummy which is equal to 1 if, in that year, the firm, that was already an exporter in the previous year,  started
exporting to at least one destination that had experienced an appreciation of i ts exchange rate. It is equal to
zero if the exporter did not start exporting to any destination that had experienced an appreciation of its
exchange rate. The explanatory variables are a m easure of the logarithm of TFPà la  Levins ohn and Petrin
(2003), a credit-constraint dummy equal to 1 if the score is below the year-3-digit-sector median, and the
interaction between TFP and this dummy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, it has been shown that credit constraints really do matter for export patterns.
Using a very precise and complete dataset on export transactions at the ￿rm level for the
Belgian manufacturing sector, it is combined with an unusual and very useful yearly measure
of credit constraints faced by ￿rms, a creditworthiness score constructed independently by a
credit insurer. These make it possible to examine the relationship between credit constraints
and exports in a novel way. The main prediction of the model is that some ￿rms could
pro￿tably export but are prevented from doing so by a lack of liquidity which stops them
from reaching foreign markets. This is re￿ ected in the data, where it is shown that ￿rms
26are more likely to be exporting if they enjoy higher productivity levels and lower credit
constraints. The second prediction of the model is that credit constraints are important in
determining the extensive margin of trade in terms of destinations, that is the number of
destinations a ￿rm exports to and the decision of a ￿rm to export to a new destination. The
intensive margin of trade in that dimension, the average exports of a ￿rm to the destinations
it serves, should not be a⁄ected by credit constraints. This equilibrium derived from the
model also holds in the data. Third, as derived in the model, ￿rms follow a pecking order
of trade, where more productive and less credit-constrained ￿rms reach markets of smaller
trade cost weighted market size. Finally, the model predicts that the sensitivity of trade ￿ ows
to exchange rate variations is composed of several elements. An exchange rate appreciation
will cause existing exporters to reduce their exports, entry of credit-constrained potential
exporters and exit of the least productive exporters. All three e⁄ects appear in the data.
These results con￿rm the link between credit constraints and export patterns. They also
highlight the potential role of institutions in determining, through their policies on credit
constraints, the patterns of trade and hence the productivity levels and gains of productivity,
and the overall welfare. As credit constraints matter, they establish a connection between
the number of markets served by a ￿rm and the growth of its exports, as additional liquidity
obtained on one market may enable another one to be entered. Examining the dynamics of
￿rm-level exports and how they relate to liquidity and productivity is an exciting area for
future research.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (repeated): If
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a non-empty set of liquidity-constrained ￿rms that are prevented from pro￿tably exporting
because they have insu¢ cient liquidity, both exogenously and on the external ￿nancial market.
Proof. All ￿rms above xf are productive enough to pro￿tably export. Firms whose liq-
uidity is lower than x(A) are not able to export, even if they could pro￿tably do so, be-
cause they do not have su¢ cient liquidity to cover the ￿xed cost of exporting. Suppose
(A;x) 2 ￿ iif xf ￿ x < x(A): Firms in ￿ are prevented from exporting because they are
29liquidity-constrained, despite being able to pro￿tably do so. x(0) > xf is a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for ￿ to be non-empty. Given equations (20) and (21), this will hold if
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w￿. Then ￿ is non-empty, and there are indeed
￿rms that are liquidity-constrained.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 (recalled): Firms will add export destinations in decreasing order of trade
cost weighted market size, L￿
￿￿￿1. More productive ￿rms will export to more destinations, but
also to relatively smaller markets.
Proof. By earning higher revenues on a larger market, lower-productivity ￿rms can export
to larger markets. Yet, the higher the iceberg cost of exporting to that destination, the lower
the revenues on that market. Hence the productivity cut-o⁄ is lower for a larger trade cost
weighted market:
@xn(A)
@ L￿
￿￿￿1
< 0. Besides, the relative ordering of countries with respect to the
productivity threshold of ￿rms exporting there remains the same. Therefore, a ￿rm that
increases the number of destinations it serves from n to (n + 1) will still export to the n
largest (trade cost weighted) markets and add the next largest (trade cost weighted) market
to its portfolio of trade partners.
C Proof of Proposition 4(3)
Proof. Given ￿ x(A) as in equation 21, the sign of
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w
depends on whether the following
expression holds:
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Cf ￿ 0, and assuming there is a non-empty
set of liquidity constrained potential exporters such that the condition from Proposition 4.1
holds, then inequality will hold if:
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As ￿ > 1 and the condition of Proposition 4.1 also implies that ￿ < 1, then the inequality of
equation (26) holds and
@￿ x(A)
@ w￿
w
> 0.
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